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I. INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Congress is generally too politically divided to take 
significant action supporting or opposing climate change regulation. 
Even on the rare occasions when it unites on this issue, it does not 
do so in a way that could survive presidential veto.  In June 2015, for 
example, the House of Representatives passed the Ratepayer 
Protection Act, a law aimed at undermining the Obama 
administration’s proposed Clean Power Plan to regulate power plant 
greenhouse gas emissions.2 This bill, however, has only symbolic 
political value; even if it passed the Senate, President Obama would
veto it.3 On the other side of the aisle, numerous efforts at passing 
comprehensive climate change legislation—including one early in 
President Obama’s first term—have failed, and little prospect exists 
for such legislation in the foreseeable future.4 Facing legislative 
gridlock in Congress, President Obama has sought to pursue his 
administration’s climate policy goals through executive action under 
existing federal environmental statutes. Such action, often in 
interaction with litigation, has become the primary mechanism for 
national-level regulation of greenhouse gas emissions from motor 
vehicles and power plants.5
Many observers, despairing over this state of affairs, wistfully 
contemplate parliamentary systems of government in other 
developed countries that seem to be more effective in passing 
legislation.6 For instance, in their book, It’s Even Worse Than It 
Looks: How the American Constitutional System Collided with the 
New Politics of Extremism, political scientists Thomas E. Mann and 
2. Kate Sheppard, House Passes Bill to Undermine Obama’s Climate Rules,
HUFFINGTON POST (June 24, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/06/24/house-climate-
delay_n_7658096.html.
3. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, STATEMENT OF 
ADMINISTRATIVE POLICY – H.R. 2042 RATEPAYER PROTECTION ACT OF 2015 (2015), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/legislative/sap/114/saphr2042r_20150623.
pdf.
4. Hari Osofsky has analyzed the barriers to federal legislation in Hari M. Osofsky, 
Litigation’s Role in the Path of U.S. Federal Climate Change Regulation: Implications of AEP 
v. Connecticut, 46 VAL. U. L. REV. 447, 448–51 (2012).
5. Id. at 447. See also JACQUELINE PEEL & HARI M. OSOFSKY, CLIMATE CHANGE 
LITIGATION: REGULATORY PATHWAYS TO CLEANER ENERGY (2015).
6. Ari Shapiro, Would the U.S. Be Better Off with a Parliament?, NPR (Oct. 12, 2013), 
http://www.npr.org/sections/itsallpolitics/2013/10/12/232270289/would-the-u-s-be-better-off-
with-a-parliament; Ishaan Tharoor, Prime Minister Obama: Would the U.S. Be Better Served 
with a Parliament?, TIME (Aug. 18, 2011), http://world.time.com/2011/08/18/prime-minister-
obama-would-the-u-s-be-better-served-by-a-parliament/. 
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Normal J. Ornstein compare the dysfunction of the U.S. political 
system unfavorably with parliamentary democracies, where it is 
easier for majorities to act. Vehemently adversarial parties in the 
U.S. separation-of-powers government system, they say, “are a 
formula for willful obstruction and policy irresolution.”7
But are parliamentary democracies any more effective at 
dealing with major policy issues such as climate change where deep 
partisan divisions exist? In this essay, we compare the U.S. 
experience of congressional dysfunction and executive action 
regarding climate change with that of Australia, which has a 
parliamentary system of government. Both countries have high 
levels of partisanship on issues of climate change and energy, but 
Australia does not face the same level of legislative gridlock 
because the party that leads its House of Representatives selects its 
prime minister. Instead, Australia has seen climate change 
legislation pass and then be repealed as government control shifts 
between parties.8 This divergent Australian experience raises the 
question of whether it is better to have gridlock or legislative 
uncertainty; neither of which is ideal.
Parts II and III examine the respective experiences in the United 
States and Australia in attempting to make progress on climate 
action in a partisan environment. These Parts compare the two 
countries’ systems of government, how they function when the 
public and political parties are deeply divided on policy questions, 
and the way in which these interactions have played out in the 
development of climate policy over the past two decades. The essay 
concludes with a reflection on the difficulties faced under both 
systems and considers possibilities for a better way forward.
II. U.S. CONGRESSIONAL DYSFUNCTION AND EXECUTIVE ACTION
This Part explores the ways in which partisanship, paired with a 
system of government based on separation of powers and checks 
and balances, has resulted in congressional gridlock and executive 
assertions of authority on climate change. It begins with a brief 
overview of the U.S. system of government, then turns to a 
discussion of the intense partisanship over the issue of climate 
7. THOMAS E. MANN & NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, IT’S EVEN WORSE THAN IT LOOKS: HOW THE 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM COLLIDED WITH THE NEW POLITICS OF EXTREMISM, xiii 
(2012).
8. See infra Part III.
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change, and concludes by analyzing how that partisanship has 
played out in the federal government.
A. U.S. Divided Control of Government
The U.S. Constitution establishes the three federal branches of 
government and their relationship to one another. This Section 
traces the ways in which this structure creates a greater separation 
among the three branches in comparison to Australia’s 
parliamentary system.
Article I establishes the Senate and House of Representatives 
and designates their election procedures, powers, and limitations. 
Most significantly, for the purposes of this essay, Section 8 provides 
Congress with legislative authority under its powers.9 As discussed 
more in the following Part, this legislative structure is not significantly 
different from that of Australia’s bicameral legislature.
Article II, however, creates the most significant divergence 
between the U.S. and Australian forms of government. It establishes 
an executive branch led by a president elected by state-designated 
electors, and thus separates the head of the executive branch from 
congressional leadership.10 Because the president leads neither the 
Senate nor the House, the executive’s role in advancing legislation 
is far more limited than in a parliamentary system.
Article III creates the judicial branch, and provides for a 
Supreme Court and congressional authority to create lower federal 
courts. Although it does not provide detailed explanation of the 
federal courts’ roles, they are widely viewed as interpreting and
evaluating laws in the U.S. common law system.11 Most significantly 
for executive branch action in the climate change context, as 
discussed in more depth in Section II.C, the courts can evaluate the 
scope of legislation and whether executive branch agencies have 
abused their discretion in acting or failing to act.12
Interestingly, given the current gridlock, the decision to separate 
executive and legislative authority more fully in the United States 
stemmed in part out of a fear of partisanship. For example, 
9. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
10. Id. at art. II.
11. Id. at art. III; How the U.S. Government Is Organized, Branches of Government,
USA.GOV, https://www.usa.gov/branches-of-government#item-211477 (last visited Sept. 12, 
2015). 
12. See infra Section II.C.
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Federalist Papers No. 10 provides significant analysis of the 
dangers of “mischiefs of faction” and the need for a republican form 
of government to address them.13 James Madison even 
acknowledges possibilities for gridlock in a republican system, 
explaining:
If a faction consists of less than a majority, relief is supplied by the 
republican principle, which enables the majority to defeat its 
sinister views by regular vote. It may clog the administration, it 
may convulse the society; but it will be unable to execute and 
mask its violence under the forms of the Constitution. When a 
majority is included in a faction, the form of popular government, 
on the other hand, enables it to sacrifice to its ruling passion or 
interest both the public good and the rights of other citizens.14
The U.S. system of checks and balances among the branches 
constrains the actions of all three branches, and limits their action 
substantially when the country is closely divided. As has been the 
case under many administrations, during the latter half of the 
Obama administration, a different party has controlled the legislative 
branch than controls the executive branch, and the party controlling 
the legislative branch lacks the super majority necessary to pass 
legislation that could overcome presidential veto authority.15
B. Partisan Climate Change Politics in the United States
This tendency towards legislative gridlock during times of 
political division has greatly influenced the U.S. trajectory on climate 
change. As explored in more depth in our article Energy 
Partisanship, the past two decades have seen a worsening of 
partisanship across the board in the United States.16 A 2012 study 
13. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 57–58 (James Madison) (J. & A. McLean, 1787).
14. Id. at 57.
15. Presidential Vetoes, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES: HISTORY, ART & ARCHIVES,
http://history.house.gov/Institution/Presidential-Vetoes/Presidential-Vetoes/ (last visited July 
29, 2015). George Washington exercised the first presidential veto in 1792. Washington 
Exercises First Presidential Veto, This Day in History Apr. 05, HISTORY.COM,
http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/washington-exercises-first-presidential-veto (last 
visited Sept. 13, 2015). 
16. Jacqueline Peel & Hari M. Osofsky, Energy Partisanship, 65 EMORY L.J. (forthcoming 
2016) (citing NOLAN MCCARTY ET AL., POLARIZED AMERICA: THE DANCE OF IDEOLOGY AND 
UNEQUAL RICHES (The MIT Press 2006)); Chris Cillizza, Partisanship Doesn’t Seem Worse. It 
Is Worse., WASH. POST: POL. (June 4, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-
fix/post/partisanship-doesnt-seem-worse-it-is-worse/2012/06/04/gJQAJIuzDV_blog.html); 
Nolan McCarty, What We Know and Don’t Know About Our Polarized Politics, WASH. POST:
MONKEY CAGE (Jan. 8, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-
cage/wp/2014/01/08/what-we-know-and-dont-know-about-our-polarized-politics/.
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by the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, for 
example, found that although the nation’s core beliefs and principles 
have remained pretty stable over the past 25 years, these beliefs 
are being sorted along increasingly partisan lines.17
Against that backdrop, though, environmental and climate 
issues have been especially divisive.18 Professor of Communication 
Studies Matthew Nisbet explains:
Predictably, on climate change, poll analyses reveal politically 
polarized opinions, resulting in two Americas divided along 
ideological lines. Over the past decade, an increasing majority of 
Republicans question the validity of climate science and dismiss 
the urgency of the problem, while an increasing majority of 
Democrats accept climate science and express concern about the 
issue. This deep partisan division remains even after factoring in 
education and knowledge. In fact, the persistent gap in 
perceptions over the past decade suggests that climate change 
has joined a short list of issues such as gun control or taxes that 
define what it means to be a Republican or Democrat.19
The levels of partisanship over climate change have waxed and 
waned over time, and may be lessening somewhat currently. Public 
support for action on climate change was comparatively high in 
2007, the year in which the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change and Al Gore shared a Nobel Peace Prize and the U.S. 
Supreme Court decided the landmark climate change case, 
Massachusetts v. EPA.20 However, this support declined markedly 
over the years that followed, reaching such a nadir by 2012 that 
Professor Richard Lazarus declared: “[c]limate change had become 
the political equivalent of Harry Potter’s Lord Voldemort: the crisis 
that dared not be named.”21
Superstorm Sandy was a key turning point, and successive 
polls since have shown gradually rising levels of public concern over 
17. Partisan Polarization Surges in Bush, Obama Years: Trends in American Values 
1987-2012, PEW RESEARCH CTR. FOR THE PEOPLE & PRESS 1, 17–18 (June 4, 2012), 
http://www.people-press.org/files/legacy-pdf/06-04-12%20Values%20Release.pdf; Energy 
Partisanship, supra note 16.
18. Peel & Osofsky, supra note 16.
19. Matthew C. Nisbet, Communicating Climate Change: Why Frames Matter for Public 
Engagement, ENV’T: SCI. & POL’Y FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV. 12, 12–14 (2009).
20. Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 549 U.S. 497 (2007); Frank Newport, 
Americans Show Low Levels of Concern on Global Warming, GALLUP (Apr. 4, 2014), 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/168236/americans-show-low-levels-concern-global-warming.aspx; 
The Nobel Peace Prize 2007, NOBELPRIZE.ORG,
http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2007/ (last visited Sept. 15, 2015). 
21. Richard J. Lazarus, Presidential Combat Against Climate Change, 126 HARV. L. REV.
F. 152 (2013).
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climate change and willingness to take action to address it among 
Democrats, Republicans, and Independents.22 For instance, a 2015 
New York Times-Stanford University-Resources for the Future poll 
found that seventy-eight percent of the U.S. public—including sixty 
percent of Republicans—support “the federal government limit[ing] 
the amount of greenhouse gases that U.S. businesses put out.”23
However, even with this trend, a divide still exists among 
Democrats, Republicans, and Independents in how they treat this 
issue. Republicans remain less likely to support policy measures to 
address climate change and more likely to vote for those who deny 
climate change science or do not view themselves as qualified to 
evaluate the science.24 There are also partisan differences in how 
important the issue is to people and how concerned they are about 
the cost of measures to address it. For instance, in the above-
mentioned 2015 poll, sixty-three percent of Democrats indicated that 
global warming was very or extremely important to them personally 
as compared to eighteen percent of Republicans, and forty-seven 
percent of Republicans worried that measures to address climate 
change would harm the economy.25 As the next section explores, 
these party divides have translated into congressional inaction in the 
United States.
22. Lisa Lerer, Americans by 2 to 1 Would Pay More to Curb Climate Change,
BLOOMBERG NEWS (June 11, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-06-
10/americans-by-2-to1-would-pay-more-to-curb-climate-change; Lydia Saad, Republican 
Skepticism Toward Global Warming Eases, GALLUP (Apr. 9, 2013), 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/161714/republican-skepticism-global-warming-eases.aspx; Lydia 
Saad, Americans’ Concerns About Global Warming on the Rise, GALLUP (Apr. 8, 2013), 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/161645/americans-concerns-global-warming-rise.aspx; How
Americans View the Top Energy and Environmental Issues, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Jan. 15, 
2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/key-data-points/environment-energy-2/.
23. Global Warming: What Should Be Done?, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/01/29/us/global-warming-poll.html. 48 percent of 
Republican respondents also said that they were more likely to vote for a candidate who 
supports dealing with climate change. Id. For a discussion of the poll, see Coral Davenport &
Marjorie Connelly, Most Republicans Say They Back Climate Action, Poll Finds, N.Y. TIMES:
POL. (Jan. 30, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/31/us/politics/most-americans-support-
government-action-on-climate-change-poll-
finds.html?emc=edit_na_20150130&nlid=52930963&_r=0.
24. Peel & Osofsky, supra note 16.
25. Davenport & Connelly, supra note 23; Peel & Osofsky, supra note 16.
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C. U.S. Climate Change Policy—A Tale of Congressional 
Dysfunction and Executive Action
The U.S. approach to addressing the problem of climate change 
reflects the combination of structural barriers to legislative action 
and partisanship over climate change discussed in the previous two 
sections. The United States, unlike Australia, has broad 
environmental statutes with significant citizen suits provisions,26 but 
very limited federal statutory law directly addressing climate change. 
U.S. federal laws on climate change primarily focus on data 
collection and scientific research, with some language about 
coordination and international leadership.27 Congressional gridlock 
has constrained both legislative efforts to undermine those broad 
environmental statutes and those aimed at passing comprehensive 
climate change legislation. Even early in President Obama’s first 
term, when his party held both houses of Congress, comprehensive 
climate change legislation failed to pass.28
As a consequence, the president and executive branch 
agencies—in recent years galvanized or influenced by litigation—
have deeply shaped the U.S. regulatory path regarding climate 
change. This Section explores the crucial role of the U.S. executive 
branch and limited role of the legislative branch in determining how 
the United States has responded to climate change since its failure 
to ratify the Kyoto Protocol two decades ago. Like in Australia, 
control of the legislative and executive branches has shifted back 
and forth during this time period.29 But without major legislation on 
climate change—only broader statutes with implications for climate 
change like various acts reforming energy regulation and including 
financial incentives for renewables—executive branch direction and 
initiatives have dominated the U.S. approach.
26. Citizen suits involve lawsuits by private citizens to enforce a statute. Such provisions 
are particularly common in the field of environmental law. See Michael S. Greve, The Private 
Enforcement of Environmental Law, 65 TUL. L. REV. 339 (1990); James R. May, Now More 
Than Ever: Trends in Environmental Citizen Suits at 30, 10 WIDENER L. REV. 1 (2003).
27. See Hari M. Osofsky & Jacqueline Peel, Litigation’s Regulatory Pathways and the 
Administrative State: Lessons from U.S. and Australian Climate Change Governance, 25 GEO.
INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 207, 223 (2013); Hari M. Osofsky, Diagonal Federalism and Climate 
Change: Implications for the Obama Administration, 62 ALA. L. REV. 237 (2011) [hereinafter 
Diagonal Federalism].
28. See Diagonal Federalism, supra note 27. For the defeated legislation, see The 
American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (2009).
29. See infra Part III.
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1. The Death of Kyoto Ratification and Executive Action
The limited U.S. legislation on climate change predates the 
Clinton administration and the death of Kyoto Protocol ratification in 
the Senate.30 The 1978 National Climate Program Act required the 
president to establish a program to “assist the Nation and the world 
to understand and respond to natural and man-induced climate 
processes and their implications.”31 In accordance with that law, 
President Carter commissioned a National Research Council report 
which produced findings indicating the seriousness of the problem 
and need to act: “[i]f carbon dioxide continues to increase, the study 
group finds no reason to doubt that climate changes will result and 
no reason to believe that these changes will be negligible . . . [a] 
wait-and-see policy may mean waiting until it is too late.”32 The 1987 
Global Climate Protection Act, passed when Ronald Reagan was 
president, included language about “coordinated national policy” and 
U.S. leadership in international efforts to address climate change,33
but without specific mandates to achieve those goals. Although this 
Act has been amended since, follow-up legislative efforts to create a 
more comprehensive regime have still failed.
President Clinton’s executive action on climate change was far 
less extensive than the regulations being promulgated under 
President Obama, but the pattern of congressional gridlock paired 
with executive action was similar. President Clinton’s administration, 
led by Vice President Al Gore, participated actively in the Kyoto 
Protocol negotiations, shaping some of its key attributes. However, 
at home, President Clinton faced such difficult legislative barriers 
that he did not even submit the Kyoto Protocol for ratification. The 
Senate unanimously passed a resolution stating that the United 
States should not ratify the Kyoto Protocol because it did not include 
developing-country major emitters like China and India.34 This 
resolution made it clear that despite the Clinton administration’s 
desire to join many of the other developed-country major emitters in 
30. Hari M. Osofsky has described this legislation in depth in her prior work. Diagonal 
Federalism, supra note 27, at 246.
31. National Climate Program Act, Pub. L. No. 95-367, 92 Stat. 601, 601 (1978) (codified 
as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2901–2908 (2006)).
32. Verner E. Suomi, Foreword to CARBON DIOXIDE AND CLIMATE: A SCIENTIFIC 
ASSESSMENT vii, viii (1979).
33. Global Climate Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 100-204, §§ 1101–06, 101 Stat. 1331, 
1408 (1987) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 2901 (2006)).
34. S. Res. 98, 105th Cong. (1997) (enacted).
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making binding commitments to targets and timetables, Congress 
would prevent such action.35
Despite this Kyoto Protocol defeat, the Clinton administration 
advanced many initiatives to address greenhouse gas emissions. 
Many of these efforts focused on spurring technological 
development needed to reduce emissions. They included the 
Climate Change Technology Initiative and partnerships with industry 
such as the Partnership for a New Generation of Vehicles (PNGV), 
the Partnership for Advancing Technology in Housing (PATH), 
Energy Star, Climate Wise, and Industries of the Future.36 President 
Clinton secured more than $3 billion in annual funding—a fifty 
percent increase—for research and development of clean energy 
technologies.37 The Clinton administration also promulgated energy 
efficiency standards aimed at reducing the average appliance’s 
energy use by thirty percent.38
2. “Unsigning” the Kyoto Protocol and Refusing EPA 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions Regulation
President George W. Bush’s presidency brought a more 
complex relationship between the executive branch and climate 
change action. As during the Clinton administration, congressional 
action on climate change was limited. The 2007 Energy 
Independence and Security Act (EISA) was arguably the law with 
the most significance for climate change passed during Bush’s 
presidency. It included, for example, stricter CAFE standards that 
required automakers to bring fleet-wide gas mileage to thirty-five 
miles per gallon (mpg) by 2020.39 Numerous bills were introduced 
during President Bush’s two terms to address climate change 
directly, but all of them died in committee.40
35. See SUSAN R. FLETCHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 30692, GLOBAL CLIMATE 
CHANGE: THE KYOTO PROTOCOL 2 (2005).
36. See The Clinton Presidency: Protecting Our Environment and Public Health, THE
CLINTON-GORE ADMIN.: A RECORD OF PROGRESS,
http://clinton5.nara.gov/WH/Accomplishments/eightyears-08.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2015). 
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. See Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-140, 121 Stat. 
1492, 1499 (2007).
40. For examples of proposed legislation that died in committee in the Senate or House, 
see Carbon Leakage Prevention Act, H.R. 7146, 110th Cong. (2008); Climate MATTERS Act 
of 2008, H.R. 6316, 110th Cong. (2008); Climate Stewardship and Economic Security Act of 
2007, H.R. 4226, 110th Cong. (2007); Low Carbon Economy Act of 2007, S. 1766, 110th 
Cong. (2007); Clean Air Planning Act of 2007, S. 1177, 110th Cong. (2007); Safe Climate Act 
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President Bush, unlike some of the outspoken Republicans 
during President Obama’s administration and the 2016 election, 
acknowledged human-caused climate change as a serious problem. 
In the same speech in which he rejected the Kyoto Protocol as an 
“unsound international treaty that will throw millions of our citizens 
out of work,” he reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the 
importance of acting to reduce emissions, stating:
[W]e must address the issue of global climate change. We must 
also act in a serious and responsible way, given the scientific 
uncertainties. While these uncertainties remain, we can begin now 
to address the human factors that contribute to climate change. 
Wise action now is an insurance policy against future risks.41
In that speech, he also committed to “cutting our nation’s 
greenhouse gas intensity—how much we emit per unit of economic 
activity—by 18% over the next 10 years” through agreements with 
key industries; developing standards for measuring emissions and 
providing companies that can show real measurable reductions with 
transferrable credits; and promoting renewable energy, clean coal 
production, and nuclear power.42 Internationally, the Bush 
administration led the push for an Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean 
Development and Climate Change (which included Australia)—a
bottom-up model of nationally-nominated emissions reduction 
targets that was designed as an alternative to the top-down targets 
and timetable approach of the Kyoto Protocol.43
of 2007, H.R. 1590, 110th Cong. (2007); Global Warming Reduction Act of 2007, S. 485, 
110th Cong. (2007); Climate Stewardship Act of 2007, H.R. 620, 110th Cong. (2007); Electric 
Utility Cap and Trade Act of 2007, S. 317, 110th Cong. (2007); Global Warming Pollution 
Reduction Act, S. 309, 110th Cong. (2007); Climate Stewardship and Innovation Act of 2007, 
S. 280, 110th Cong. (2007); Global Warming Reduction Act of 2006, S. 4039, 109th Cong. 
(2006); Safe Climate Act of 2006, H.R. 5642, 109th Cong. (2006); Clean Air Planning Act of 
2006, S. 2724, 109th Cong. (2006); Keep America Competitive Global Warming Policy Act of 
2006, H.R. 5049, 109th Cong. (2006); New Apollo Energy Act of 2005, H.R. 2828, 109th 
Cong. (2005); Climate Stewardship and Innovation Act of 2005, S. 1151, 109th Cong. (2005); 
Climate Stewardship Act of 2005, S. 342, 109th Cong. (2005); Climate Stewardship Act of 
2005, H.R. 759, 109th Cong. (2005); Climate Stewardship Act of 2004, H.R. 4067, 108th 
Cong. (2004); Climate Stewardship Act of 2003, S. 139, 108th Cong. (2003).
41. See President George W. Bush, Address at the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (June 11, 2001). 
42. Id.
43. For discussion of the Asia-Pacific Partnership, see Peter Christoff & Robyn 
Eckersley, The Kyoto Protocol and the Asia Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and 
Climate, in CLIMATE LAW IN AUSTRALIA 32 (Tim Bonyhady & Peter Christoff eds., 2007). 
Ironically, the bottom-up approach of the Asia-Pacific Partnership is now the model being 
pursued in international negotiations for a new, post-2020 climate agreement.
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However, despite these commitments, the Bush administration 
repeatedly refused to regulate domestic greenhouse gas emissions 
under existing environmental laws, and prevented leader states from 
moving ahead with their own regulation of greenhouse gas motor 
vehicles emissions.44 The executive branch’s refusal to take these 
steps to regulate greenhouse gas emissions, and continued 
congressional inaction, helped spur a growth in climate change 
litigation, which first emerged in the United States in the 1990’s.45
One of these challenges led, in 2007, to the landmark decision in 
Massachusetts v. EPA, in which the Supreme Court ruled that the 
Bush administration EPA had abused its discretion in the way in 
which it refused to regulate motor vehicle greenhouse gas emissions 
under the Clean Air Act.46 Although the Bush administration did not 
take significant action pursuant to that decision, as discussed in the 
following section, the case provided the basis for extensive 
regulation of motor vehicles and major stationary sources by the 
Obama administration.
3. The Death of Comprehensive Climate Change Legislation 
and Major New Executive Action
Although the pattern of limited congressional action and 
substantial executive branch power over the shape of U.S. efforts on 
climate change continued under the Obama administration, the 
scope of his administration’s actions was far greater. President 
Obama began taking steps through federal agencies to regulate 
under the Clean Air Act pursuant to Massachusetts v. EPA within a 
week of taking office, even as his administration worked with 
legislators to try to pass comprehensive climate change legislation.47
After making an Endangerment Finding necessary to regulate 
pollutants under the Clean Air Act in 2009,48 the EPA under 
44. Editorial, Arrogance and Warming, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 21, 2007), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/21/ opinion/21fri1.html? r=0; John M. Broder & Felicity 
Barringer, E.P.A. Says 17 States Can’t Set Greenhouse Gas Rules for Cars, N.Y. TIMES (Dec.
20, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/20/Washington/20epa.html.
45. CLIMATE CHANGE LITIGATION, supra note 5, at 19.
46. Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 549 U.S. 497 (2007); CLIMATE CHANGE 
LITIGATION, supra note 5, at 63.
47. For more detailed discussion of the Obama administration’s initial action on climate 
change, see Hari M. Osofsky, Is Climate Change “International”?: Litigation’s Diagonal 
Regulatory Role, 49 VA. J. INT’L L. 585 (2009).
48. Endangerment and Cause and Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases under 
Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act; Final Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 66496 (Dec. 15, 2009) (to be 
codified at 40 C.F.R. ch. I).
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President Obama began regulating emissions from motor vehicles 
and major stationary sources (such as power plants).49 Under the 
“National Program,” the EPA and Department of Transportation 
have promulgated joint regulations regarding fuel economy and 
tailpipe greenhouse gas emissions.50 In 2010, the agencies finalized 
their first set of light-duty vehicles rules for model years 2012-
2016.51 They have since addressed post-2017 model years of light-
duty vehicles, medium and heavy vehicles, and harmonizing federal 
and California standards.52 To date, this program has survived all 
judicial challenges and automakers have been on track for meeting 
the standards.53
Parallel to its motor vehicles regulations, the EPA has also been 
acting under § 111 of the Clean Air Act to address emissions from 
power plants and other stationary sources.  The EPA’s first step in 
2010 was to establish threshold greenhouse gas permit 
requirements, which aimed at focusing its regulation on only the 
49. For an overview of the EPA’s mitigation efforts, see Regulatory Initiatives, U.S.
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/EPAactivities/regulatory-
initiatives.html (last updated Aug. 3, 2015).
50. Notice of Upcoming Joint Rulemaking to Establish Vehicle GHG Emissions and 
CAFE Standards, 74 Fed. Reg. 24,007 (May 22, 2009). The EPA regulations focus on tailpipe 
emissions under the Clean Air Act, and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 
(NHTSA) regulations involve CAFE standards under the Energy Independence and Security 
Act and the Energy Policy Conservation Act. They are coordinated for the first time under this 
program on the basis that “[t]he close relationship between emissions of CO2 [carbon dioxide] 
– the most prevalent greenhouse gas emitted by motor vehicles – and fuel consumption, 
means that the technologies to control CO2 emissions and to improve fuel economy overlap to 
a great degree.” Id. at 24,009 n.7. For further discussion of compliance and measurement 
under the program, see id.
51. See Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate 
Average Fuel Economy Standards; Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 25,324 (May 7, 2010) (to be 
codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 85, 86, and 600; 49 C.F.R. pts. 531, 533, 536 et al.); see also 
President Barack Obama, Remarks on National Fuel Efficiency Standards in the Rose Garden 
(May 19, 2009) (on file at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_ press_ office/Remarks-by-the-
President-on-national-fuel-efficiency-standards/).
52. Notice of Intent, 75 Fed. Reg. 62,739 (Oct. 13, 2010) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pts. 
531, 533); Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards and Fuel Efficiency Standards for Medium 
and Heavy-Duty Engines and Vehicles, 75 Fed. Reg. 74152 (Nov. 30, 2010) (to be codified at 
49 C.F.R. pts. 523, 534, 535). For correction to proposed rules, see Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions Standards and Fuel Efficiency Standards for Medium and Heavy-Duty Engines and 
Vehicles, 75 Fed. Reg. 81952 (Dec. 29, 2010) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 201); Press 
Release, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency & U.S. Dep’t of Transp., EPA, DOT and California Align 
Timeframe for Proposing Standards for Next Generation of Clean Cars (Jan. 24, 2011) (on file 
at 
http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/6424ac1caa800aab85257359003f5337/6f34c8d6f2
b11e5885257822006f60c0!OpenDocument).
53. See Press Release, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, EPA Report: Data Show Automakers 
on Track in meeting Greenhouse Gas Standards (Apr. 25, 2014) (on file at 
http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/0/A04E3F24D235D141852 57CC5004 F1907).
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most significant emitters that account for seventy percent of 
emissions.54 The EPA proposed a “Carbon Pollution Standard” for 
new power plants under Clean Air Act § 111(b) in 2013, which was 
very controversial because coal-fired power plants could only meet it 
through partial carbon sequestration and storage.55 The EPA put 
forward its “Clean Power Plan” in 2014—revised over the course of 
the next year in response to feedback and proposed in final form in 
201556—which proposes “emission guidelines for states to follow in 
developing plans to address greenhouse gas emissions from 
existing fossil fuel-fired electric generating units.”57 The plan aims to 
reduce carbon dioxide emissions from the power sector by 30 
percent from 2005 levels by 2030.58
These efforts have been extremely controversial and 
challenged through legislation, such as the Ratepayer Protection Act
mentioned in the introduction, and lawsuits.59 Thus far, federal 
courts have deemed the Clean Power Plan challenges brought prior 
to the final rule premature,60 and the Supreme Court has partially 
54. Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, 
75 Fed. Reg. 31,514 (June 3, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 70 et al.); Press 
Release, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, EPA to Set Modest Pace for Greenhouse Gas Standards 
(Dec. 23, 2010) (on file at 
http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/6424ac1caa800aab85257359003f5337/d2f038e9d
aed78de8525780200568bec!OpenDocument); Clean Air Act Permitting for Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions - Final Rules, Fact Sheet, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (Dec. 23, 2010), 
http://www.epa.gov/NSR/ghgdocs/20101223factsheet.pdf.
55. See Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from New Stationary 
Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 79 Fed. Reg. 1430 (Jan. 8, 2014) (to be codified at 
40 C.F.R. pts. 60, 70, 71 and 98); Gina McCarthy, Keynote Remarks at the University of 
Michigan Environmental Law and Public Health Conference, 3 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 243
(2014).
56. Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Source: Electric Utility 
Generating Units, Prepublication Version of the Final Rule, 79 Fed. Reg. 67406 (Aug. 3, 2015) 
(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. Part 60) [hereinafter Clean Power Plan].
57. Id.
58. News Release, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, EPA Proposes First Guidelines to Cut 
Carbon Pollution from Existing Power Plants/Clean Power Plan is Flexible Proposal to Ensure 
a Healthier Environment, Spur Innovation and Strengthen the Economy (June 2, 2014) (on file 
at 
http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/bd4379a92ceceeac8525735900400c27/5bb6d2066
8b9a18485257ceb00490c98!OpenDocument). 
59. Press Release, U.S. House of Representatives Energy & Commerce Comm., 
Whitfield Unveils Ratepayer Protection Act to Address EPA’s Overreaching Power Plant Rule 
(Mar. 23, 2015) (on file at http://energycommerce.house.gov/press-release/whitfield-unveils-
ratepayer-protection-act-address-epa%E2%80%99s-overreaching-power-plant-rule).
60. In re Murray Energy Corp., 788 F.3d 330 (D.C. Cir. 2015); Coral Davenport, Judges 
Skeptical of Challenge to Proposed E.P.A. Rule on Climate Change, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16, 
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/17/us/legal-battle-begins-over-obama-bid-to-curb-
greenhouse-gases.html?_r=0.
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accepted and partially rejected a challenge to the tailoring rule, 
which has limited practical consequences for what is regulated.61
However, challenges have already been brought to the final Clean 
Power Plan, including a stay request,62 emergency petition for an 
extraordinary writ,63 and fifteen cases filed by 26 states and industry 
groups that have been consolidated before the D.C. Circuit Court of 
Appeals.64 Mirroring the dynamics in other climate change cases, 
including Massachusetts v. EPA, eighteen states, the District of 
Columbia, five cities, and one county intervened on behalf of the 
EPA in those consolidated cases.65
The above mitigation actions that the Obama administration has 
attempted to justify under Massachusetts v. EPA have been 
accompanied by significant, but far less controversial, action on 
adaptation. President Obama created an Interagency Climate 
Change Adaptation Taskforce during his first year in office to explore 
how federal policies and programs could prepare for climate change 
better. He simultaneously directed federal agencies to “evaluate 
61. Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2449 (2014).
62. Letter from Elbert Lin, Solicitor Gen. of W.Va., to The Honorable Gina McCarthy, 
Adm’r, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, EPA Docket No. EPA-HQ-OAR-20 13-0602; Application for 
Administrative Stay by the State of West Virginia and 15 Other States (Aug 5, 2015) (on file at 
http://www.ago.wv.gov/Documents/WV%20-
%20Administrative%20Request%20for%20Stay%20CPP.PDF); see also John Funk, Shelve 
Clean Power Plan Until Courts Rule, Ohio, West Virginia and 13 Other States Ask EPA,
CLEVELAND.COM (Aug. 5, 2015, 6:41 PM),
http://www.cleveland.com/business/index.ssf/2015/08/shelve_clean_power_plan_until.html.
63. Petition for Extraordinary Writ to the U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, In re West Virginia, No. 
15-1277 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 13, 2015),
http://www.eenews.net/assets/2015/08/14/document_ew_04.pdf.
64. For a summary of the cases to date, discussion of potential future challenges, and 
exploration of these issues, see Legal Challenges – Overview and Documents, E&E PUBL’G,
http://www.eenews.net/interactive/clean_power_plan/fact_sheets/legal (last visited Apr. 25, 
2015). For a more detailed discussion of these lawsuits and other reactions to the Clean 
Power Plan, see Peel & Osofsky, supra note 16.
65. The intervenors on behalf of the EPA include:
the States of New York, California (by and through Governor Edmund G. Brown 
Jr., the California Air Resources Board, and Attorney General Kamala D. Harris), 
Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota (by and 
through the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency), New Hampshire, New Mexico, 
Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, Washington, the Commonwealths of 
Massachusetts and Virginia, the District of Columbia, the Cities of Boulder, 
Chicago, New York, Philadelphia, and South Miami, and Broward County, Florida 
Unopposed Motion for Leave to Intervene as Respondents, West Virginia v. Envtl. Prot. 
Agency, No. 15-1363, at 1 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 4, 2015), http://www.ag.ny.gov/pdfs/2015-11-04-
Motion-to-Intervene-FILED.pdf.
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agency climate change-risks and vulnerabilities and to manage the 
effects of climate change on the agency’s operations and mission in 
both the short and long term.”66 In 2013, both the president and 
federal agencies released climate change adaptation plans. The 
president’s Climate Action Plan addresses removing barriers to 
action; fostering state, local and tribal efforts; building scientific 
capacity; and identifying vulnerabilities across different economic
sectors.67 Agency plans focus on adaptation with respect to 
operations, missions and programs, and President Obama issued 
an additional executive order directing federal agencies to take a 
variety of steps on adaptation.68 That order also established a 
federal-level interagency Council on Climate Preparedness and 
Resilience and a multi-level State, Local, and Tribal Leaders Task 
Force on Climate Preparedness and Resilience.69
The U.S. federal government has thus had a very consistent 
structural approach to addressing climate change over the past two 
decades. Congress has not had the political cohesion to address 
climate change directly, though it has passed some legislation, 
particularly on energy, with implications for climate change.70 This 
lack of significant legislative action has made the executive branch 
particularly powerful in this sphere, often based on executive 
authority from broader statutes passed decades ago. All three of the 
past presidential administrations have followed this pattern, though 
political differences have altered how that executive authority has 
been used and litigation has accordingly tried to push or limit federal 
executive action.71
III. AUSTRALIAN LEGISLATIVE FLIP-FLOPS
Australia is just as divided along partisan lines as the United
States when it comes to issues of clean energy and climate change. 
However, in Australia, a different system of government has seen 
divergent policy outcomes on these issues. Australia’s parliamentary 
66. Exec. Order No. 13,514—Federal Leadership in Environmental, Energy, and 
Economic Performance, 74 Fed. Reg. 52,117 (Oct. 5, 2009).
67. President Obama’s Plan to Fight Climate Change, WHITE HOUSE (June, 25 2013), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/share/climate-action-plan.
68. Exec. Order No. 13,653—Preparing the United States for the Impacts of Climate 
Change, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,819 (Nov. 1, 2013).
69. Id.
70. See Diagonal Federalism, supra note 27.
71. CLIMATE CHANGE LITIGATION, supra note 5.
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system of government aligns the federal legislature with the 
executive, allowing for action by the party that wins the majority of 
seats in the lower house of parliament. Rather than legislative 
gridlock, the result has been dramatic flip-flops on climate policy 
under different administrations. Over the last two decades, Australia 
has both opposed and embraced ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, 
and has both introduced and removed a price on carbon. This policy 
inconsistency has seen it fall from being hailed as an international 
climate leader to being derided as a climate dinosaur.72
This Part examines the Australian parliamentary system of 
government, and its functioning in the context of partisan climate 
politics, as a backdrop for understanding the extraordinary 
legislative shifts on climate change that have taken place under 
successive federal governments. Although the different structure of 
government in Australia has avoided the kind of congressional 
gridlock seen in the United States, a partisan environment has 
nonetheless resulted in inconsistent policies. For those in the United 
States who pine for the greater legislative efficiency of a 
parliamentary system, Australia’s experience on climate policy 
provides a cautionary tale.
A. Australia’s Parliamentary System of Government
At first glance, Australia’s system of government looks very 
familiar to U.S. eyes. The country has a federal Constitution, closely 
modeled on the U.S. Constitution, which divides powers between 
the federal government and the six states, and also separates power 
at the federal level between the legislature, executive, and 
judiciary.73 The federal legislature consists of two houses known as 
the House of Representatives and the Senate.74 Members of the 
72. KRISTINA STEFANOVA, THE CLIMATE INST., CLIMATE OF THE NATION 2014 AUSTRALIAN
ATTITUDES ON CLIMATE CHANGE: ARE AUSTRALIANS CLIMATE DINOSAURS? 2 (2014).
73. Australian Constitution. The six states in the Commonwealth of Australia are New 
South Wales, Victoria, Queensland, South Australia, Western Australia and Tasmania. There 
are also two self-governing mainland territories: the Northern Territory and the Australian 
Capital Territory.
74. Id. pt. I §1. Members of the House of Representatives—the “people’s house”—are 
elected for three-year terms to represent their electorates, the boundaries of which are 
designated to ensure coverage of roughly equal numbers of electors. The Senate or “states’
house” has seventy-six senators, twelve from each of the country’s six states and two from 
each of the two mainland territories. Senators serve for a period of six years and are elected 
based on a system of proportional representation. See About the House of Representatives,
PARLIAMENT OF AUSTL.,
http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/House_of_Representatives/About_the_House_of_R
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House of Representatives and Senate (collectively known as the 
Australian Parliament) usually belong to one of two party groupings: 
the Australian Labor Party (with a center-left focus)75 or the Coalition 
of the Liberal Party and the National Party (both with a conservative 
focus).76 In recent years, other parties, such as the Australian 
Greens, as well as independent members, have been elected to 
both houses of parliament.77 To become legislation, laws need to 
pass each house of the Australian Parliament. Legislation then 
receives “royal assent” from the Head of Government—nominally 
the Queen of England, who exercises her powers in this regard 
through the Governor-General.78
While this system shares many structural features with the 
United States, there is an important difference. Like many western 
countries, Australia’s system of government operates as a 
parliamentary democracy and not as a strict separation-of-powers 
system.79 The political party that wins the majority of seats in the 
House of Representatives is able to form government and nominate 
its leader as Prime Minister.80 The executive government, therefore, 
effectively controls the legislature, at least in the lower house, and 
generally is able to pursue its legislative agenda efficiently.81 On 
epresentatives (last visited Sept. 14, 2015); About the Senate, PARLIAMENT OF AUSTL.,
http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Senate/About_the_Senate (last visited Sept. 14,
2015).
75. See AUSTL. LABOR PARTY, http://www.alp.org.au (last visited Sept. 15, 2015). The 
Labor Party has strong ties with the union movement.
76. For the Liberal Party, see LIBERAL PARTY OF AUSTL., https://www.liberal.org.au (last 
visited Sept. 15, 2015), and for the National Party, see THE NATIONALS,
http://www.nationals.org.au (last visited Sept. 15, 2015).
77. There are presently 10 Greens Senators and one Greens member of the lower 
house. Independents and minor parties make up a further 6 members of the Senate and 5 
members of the House of Representatives. Senate Composition, PARLIAMENT OF AUSTL.,
http://www.aph.gov.au/Senators_and_Members/Senators/Senate_composition (last visited 
Sept. 16, 2015).
78. CLAIRE MACKEN & MADELEINE DUPUCHE, LAW ESSENTIALS: FOUNDATIONS IN 
AUSTRALIAN LAW (Thomas Reuters 2011).
79. John M. Carey, Presidential Versus Parliamentary Government, in HANDBOOK OF 
NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 91, 93 (Claude Ménard & Mary M. Shirley eds., 2008).
80. Id. at 92.
81. It is still possible in the Australian system for the Senate to be controlled by a 
different party from that of the government or for independent senators and senators from 
other minor parties to make up the “balance of power” in the Senate. This is the current 
situation in the Australian Senate where Greens, minor party and independent Senators 
constitute 18 of the Senate members. The Australian Labor Party has 25 Senators and the 
Coalition has 33. To secure a majority of votes in the Senate where there is a partisan 
(Labor/Coalition divide), the Coalition government has to secure votes from the Greens or 
other independent and minor party Senates to pass legislation. See supra note 77.
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occasion, blockage of legislation through the actions of opposition or 
minor party senators may slow down progress on particular 
legislative proposals. However, the Constitution provides 
mechanisms to break deadlock if there is ongoing opposition in the 
Senate to legislation passed by the House of Representatives.82
Often, there is also strong political pressure for the upper house to 
pass government legislation or to reach a compromise, especially 
when the government has been elected with a “mandate” to pass or 
repeal certain laws.83
Australia’s parliamentary system, and the scope it allows for the 
executive to enact its legislative agenda efficiently, seems at first 
blush to compare favorably with the gridlock and legislative inaction 
seen in the United States. However, although this system tends to 
promote the passage of legislation, those legislative gains can be 
quickly reversed following elections that install a different party with 
a majority in the lower house. Rather than gridlock, the problem can 
become one of policy inconsistency as legislation radically changes 
course with successive administrations. This phenomenon of 
legislative flip flops is particularly likely where the major parties have 
strongly differing, partisan views on particular policy issues, which 
influence prevailing public attitudes. As the following Section 
explores, partisanship is a well-established feature of Australian 
climate politics just as it is in the United States.
B. Partisan Climate Politics in Australia
Australians, like their U.S. counterparts, exhibit relatively low 
levels of concern about climate change as a threat and a greater 
ambivalence about climate change science than citizens of many 
other countries.84 While compared with people in the United States, 
Australians are more likely to believe that climate change is 
happening (more than eighty percent in agreement) and to see 
82. Australian Constitution pt. I §57.
83. This was arguably the case with the Clean Energy Act following the Abbott 
government’s election win on a platform of “axing the carbon tax.” See also Katherine Murphy, 
Tony Abbott Begins Dismantling Carbon Tax: ‘Our Bill to Reduce Your Bills’, GUARDIAN (Nov. 
12, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/13/abbott-begins-dismantling-carbon-
tax. 
84. See Stuart Capstick et al., International Trends in Public Perceptions of Climate 
Change over the Past Quarter Century, 6 WIRES: CLIMATE CHANGE 35, 35–36 (2015); Irene 
Lorenzoni & Nick F. Pidgeon, Public Views on Climate Change: European and USA 
Perspectives, 77 CLIMATIC CHANGE 73, 75–76 (2006).
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human activity as a significant contributing cause,85 this has not 
translated directly into environmental concerns rising up the 
hierarchy of the general concerns of the Australian public. In recent 
surveys, Australians consistently rank climate change as lower in 
importance than other general concerns, including the economy and
other environmental issues.86
Political elites in Australia, just as in the United States, exhibit 
much more starkly divided views on climate change than do the 
general public. The Australian Labor Party, for instance, sees itself 
as “the party for the environment” and believes “[h]uman-induced 
climate change is real and it is happening now.”87 Further to the left 
of the Australian Labor Party, the Australian Greens describe 
human-induced climate change as “the greatest threat to our world” 
requiring “urgent and sustained local, national and global action;”88 a
position similar to former Labor Prime Minister Kevin Rudd’s 
declaration that climate change is “the great moral challenge of our 
generation.”89
By contrast, former conservative Prime Minister and leader of 
the ruling Coalition government up until September 14, 2015, Tony 
Abbott, is on record as saying the “climate change argument is 
absolute crap.”90 Although Abbott toned down his anti-climate 
rhetoric after becoming Prime Minister, many members of the
Liberal and National Parties that make up the Coalition, and their 
advisors, continue to hold skeptical views on climate science.91
85. ZOE LEVISTON ET AL., COMMONWEALTH SCI. & INDUS. RESEARCH ORG., FOURTH ANNUAL
SURVEY OF AUSTRALIAN ATTITUDES TO CLIMATE CHANGE: INTERIM REPORT (2014). It is likely that 
a greater occurrence of extreme weather events in Australia, including major floods, fires, 
droughts, and cyclones, has prompted more concern about local climate change effects. See
STEFANOVA, supra note 72. Despite general agreement that climate change is happening,
partisan divides are more apparent with conservative voters much more likely to see the 
causes of climate change as natural. See LEVISTON ET AL.
86. See id supra note 85, at 5. Respondents ranked climate change as the 14th most 
important concern among 16 general concerns, and 7th out of 8 environmental concerns.
87. AUSTL. LABOR PARTY, http://www.alp.org.au/asustainableenvironment (last visited 
Sept. 23, 2015).
88. Climate Change and Energy, AUSTL. GREENS, http://greens.org.au/policies/climate-
change-energy (last visited Sept. 23, 2015).
89. Australian Labor, Climate Change: The Great Moral Challenge of Our Generation,
YOUTUBE (Aug. 6, 2007), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CqZvpRjGtGM.
90. Interview with Kerry O’Brien, The 7.30 Report, on ABC Television (Feb. 2, 2010). In 
the interview, Tony Abbott retreats from his previous statement at a meeting in October 2011 
that “The climate change argument is absolute crap,” characterizing this as “a little bit of 
rhetorical hyperbole” which did “not represent my considered position.”
91. For instance, Chair of the former Prime Minister’s Business Advisory Council, 
Maurice Newman, wrote in The Australian newspaper in May 2015 that “global warming is the 
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Even so, there are significant differences of opinion on climate 
change within the ruling Coalition government. For instance, new 
Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull—installed on September 14, 2015 
after a leadership spill displaced the unpopular Tony Abbott92—is
regarded as a climate change moderate who has previously 
supported cost-effective, market-based approaches for reducing 
Australia’s greenhouse gas emissions.93
Partisan divides over climate change have played an important 
role in shaping policy, public attitudes, and activism on the issue in 
Australia. As the next section discusses further, the ten-year period 
of the government of conservative Prime Minister John Howard saw 
the emergence of a very similar political stance on climate change to 
that of the U.S. Bush administration, particularly from 2001 onwards. 
Like President Bush’s administration, the Howard government 
rejected the Kyoto Protocol and resisted the introduction of domestic 
mitigation measures, under heavy lobbying from the coal mining 
industry.94 This approach generated similar public and political 
dissent to that seen in the United States. The courts became a focus 
for many environmental groups frustrated with the lack of federal 
action on climate change,95 while at the sub-national level the Labor 
hook” designed to institute “a new world order under the control of the UN.” Maurice Newman, 
The UN is Using Climate Change as a Tool Not an Issue, AUSTRALIAN (May 8, 2015),
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/opinion/the-un-is-using-climate-change-as-a-tool-not-an-
issue/story-e6frg6zo-1227343839905. A month later at the Liberal Party federal council 
meeting in June 2015, a group of rural members of the party put forward a motion calling for a 
parliamentary inquiry to “examine the scientific evidence that underpins the man-made global 
warming theory and investigate the reasons for the failure of computer models, the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and prominent individuals to predict, among 
other things, the pause in global warming this century.” Eliza Borello, Rural Liberals Put 
Climate Skepticism on Agenda at Federal Council Meeting in Melbourne, ABC NEWS (June 
23, 2015), http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-06-23/rural-liberals-put-climate-scepticism-on-
agenda-at-party-summit/6568082.
92. Since April 2014, the Abbott government trailed the Labor opposition in the polls. See
Daniel Munoz & Ian Waldie, Tony Abbott Ousted from Power as Australia’s Prime Minister,
CBS NEWS (Sept. 14, 2015),  http://www.cbsnews.com/news/tony-abbott-ousted-from-power-
as-australias-prime-minister/; see also Terrence McCoy, How Australia’s Winking Tony Abbott 
Became One of the World’s Most Unpopular Prime Ministers, WASH. POST (May 22, 2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2014/05/22/how-australias-winking-
tony-abbott-became-one-of-the-worlds-most-unpopular-prime-ministers/.
93. Lenore Taylor, Malcolm Turnbull: Three Things We Need to Know about Our New 
Prime Minister, GUARDIAN (Sept. 14, 2015), 
http://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2015/sep/14/malcolm-turnbull-the-three-things-
we-need-to-know-about-the-challenger.
94. GUY PEARSE, HIGH AND DRY: JOHN HOWARD, CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE SELLING OF 
AUSTRALIA’S FUTURE (2007).
95. Jacqueline Peel, The Role of Climate Change Litigation in Australia’s Response to 
Global Warming, 24 ENVTL. & PLANNING L. J. 90, 90–96 (2007).
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state governments of the day pursued proactive climate policies and 
worked towards an inter-state emissions trading scheme.96
Dissatisfaction with the Howard government’s approach to climate 
change and an increasing public belief in the need for action 
contributed to the victory of Kevin Rudd and the Labor Party at the 
2007 federal election.
Paralleling developments in the United States, the year 2007 
was a particularly high point for Australian public awareness and 
concern regarding climate change.97 However, over the next four 
years, there was a general shift “down” in the Australian public’s 
attitude towards the threat of climate change.98 As in the United 
States, the failure of domestic and international efforts to make 
progress on the issue was apparently a contributing factor.99 When 
domestic legislation on climate change did eventually emerge under 
the Labor government led by Prime Minister Julia Gillard, partisan 
rhetoric on climate change—particularly voiced by then opposition 
leader, Tony Abbott—fed into negative public attitudes about the 
need for climate action. During this period, while many Australians 
continued to believe that climate change was real, a declining 
number of them saw this change as being a result of human 
activity.100 A strong correlation also emerged between political 
preference and belief in and attitudes towards climate change.101
96. For discussion of state initiatives and the proposed inter-state emissions trading 
scheme (which was shelved when Kevin Rudd was elected Prime Minister) see ALEXANDER 
ZAHAR ET AL., AUSTRALIAN CLIMATE LAW IN GLOBAL CONTEXT 151–57 (2013).
97. THE CLIMATE INST., CLIMATE OF THE NATION: AUSTRALIANS ATTITUDES TO CLIMATE
CHANGE AND ITS SOLUTIONS (2007),
http://www.climateinstitute.org.au/verve/_resources/climatenation_2007.pdf; Natalie Collins, 
What Do Australians Say About Climate Change? (Crawford School of Econ. & Gov’t, Austl. 
Nat’l Univ., Policy & Governance Discussion Paper No. 09-01, 2009) 
https://crawford.anu.edu.au/degrees/pogo/discussion_papers/PDP09-01.pdf.
98. Anita Pugliese & Linda Lyons, Australians’ Views Shift on Climate Change, GALLUP
(Aug. 6, 2010), http://www.gallup.com/poll/141782/australians-views-shift-climate-
change.aspx. 
99. Australians support for tackling climate change decreased over the period of the 
Rudd government from a high of 75% in 2007 to just 46% support in 2011. Fergus Hanson, 
The Lowy Institute Poll 2011: Australia and the World Public Opinion and Foreign Policy,
LOWY INST. FOR INT’L POLICY (2011), http://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/2011-lowy-
institute-poll.
100. ZOE LEVISTON ET AL., COMMONWEALTH SCI. & INDUS. RESEARCH ORG., SECOND
ANNUAL SURVEY OF AUSTRALIAN ATTITUDES TO CLIMATE CHANGE: INTERIM REPORT (2011), 
https://publications.csiro.au/rpr/download?pid=csiro:EP116224&dsid=DS2. 
101. Id. For instance, a Morgan telephone poll conducted in July 2011 (when legislation to 
establish a carbon price was being debated in the federal parliament) found 37 percent of 
respondents asked for their view of global warming believed “concerns are exaggerated,” and
58 per cent opposed the proposed carbon pricing mechanism. Only 37% of Australians 
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In the wake of Tony Abbott’s victory in the September 2013 
federal election, public attitudes on climate change appeared to 
again shift, with increasing criticism of the government’s policy 
record.102 Polls also recorded widespread public dissatisfaction with 
the federal government’s management of climate change, which 
most ranked as “below average.”103 It is possible that with the 
installation of climate moderate, Malcolm Turnbull, as the new 
leader of the Liberal party and the country’s twenty-ninth Prime 
Minister, there will be greater alignment between government policy 
and public attitudes on climate change. However, a major hurdle for 
the new Prime Minister remains: convincing hard-line climate 
skeptics within his own Coalition government of the need for more 
stringent measures to reduce emissions.104
C. Australian Climate Policy – A Tale of Inconsistency
Fluctuating public attitudes to climate change coupled with 
partisan politics on the issue have made for a toxic policy mix in 
Australia. Indeed, one journalist evocatively labeled climate change 
the “killing fields” of Australian politics because the issue has been 
the political death of several leaders—from both parties—over the 
last two decades.105 This Section tells the story of Australia’s policy 
twists and turns on climate change, from the Howard government’s 
opposition to ratifying the Kyoto Protocol in the early 2000’s, to the 
efforts under the Labor Rudd and Gillard governments to price 
Support the Gillard Government’s Carbon Tax While Clear Majority (58%–up 5%) Do Not, ROY 
MORGAN RESEARCH (July 15, 2011), http://www.roymorgan.com/findings/finding-4686-
201302150110.
102. 2015 Lowy Institution Poll Finds Rapidly Shifting Attitudes on Climate Issues and 
Strong Views About Solar, LOWY INST. FOR INT’L POLICY (2015),
http://www.lowyinstitute.org/news-and-media/press-releases/2015-lowy-institute-poll-finds-
rapidly-shifting-attitudes-climate-issues-and-strong-views-about [hereinafter 2015 Lowy 
Institution Poll]. See also Oliver Millman, Australians Unhappy over Coalition’s Response to 
Climate Change, GUARDIAN (June 22, 2014), 
http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/jun/22/australian-unhappy-coalitions-response-
climate. 
103. 2015 Lowy Institution Poll, supra note 102. See also STEFANOVA, supra note 72,
which found, for the first time, greater support for laws that would put a price on carbon than 
opposition to such laws. 
104. Peter Hartcher, The Ties That Blind: Tony Abbott Never Cut it as a Unifying National 
Leader, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (Sept. 15, 2015), http://www.theage.com.au/federal-
politics/political-opinion/the-ties-that-blind-abbott-never-cut-it-as-a-unifying-national-leader-
20150914-gjmi4i.html#ixzz3lifsqqCG.
105. James West, How the Carbon Tax Became the ‘Killing Fields’ of Australian Politics,
GUARDIAN (Sept. 6, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2013/sep/06/election-
2013-carbon-price-australian-politics.
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carbon, and finally to the repeal of the carbon price legislation under 
Abbott’s Coalition government, which is now led by new Prime 
Minister, Malcolm Turnbull. As the discussion illustrates, in a 
partisan environment, the legislative efficiency of a parliamentary-
style government can come at the price of policy inconsistency.
1. Early Australian Climate Policy Mirroring the United States
During the 1990’s, Australian governments were enthusiastic 
proponents of action on climate change. The country was one of the 
first to ratify the UNFCCC.106 The Labor government of the day 
subsequently announced an emissions reduction target of twenty 
percent below 1990 levels by 2005,107 albeit with the caveat that “the 
Government will not proceed with measures which have net adverse 
economic impacts nationally or on Australia’s trade competitiveness 
in the absence of similar action by major greenhouse gas producing 
countries.”108
These concerns about the potential economic impact of climate 
change measures underpinned the climate policy of the 
conservative Howard government that came to power in 1996.109
While Australia participated in the international negotiations for the 
Kyoto Protocol, the government’s focus was on securing key 
concessions in the treaty text, including a generous target of 108 
percent of 1990 levels by 2012.110 The Howard government 
subsequently signed the Kyoto Protocol in 1998. However, its close 
ties to the Bush administration in the United States saw the 
Australian government follow the U.S. lead when the latter rejected 
the Protocol in 2001.111
106. Status of Ratification of the Convention, U.N. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE 
CHANGE (May 2, 1992), 
http://www.unfccc.int/essential_background/convention/status_of_ratification/items/2631.php.
107. Australia & Greenhouse Parliament - A Chronology, PARLIAMENT OF AUSTL.,
http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/
Publications_Archive/Background_Papers/bp9798/98bp04 (last visited Sept. 27, 2015).
108. CLIVE HAMILTON, RUNNING FROM THE STORM: THE DEVELOPMENT OF CLIMATE CHANGE
POLICY IN AUSTRALIA 33 (2001).
109. Nick Minchin, Responding to Climate Change: Providing a Policy Framework for a
Competitive Australia, 24 U. N.S.W. L.J. 550, 550–55 (2001).
110. Vincent Cusack, Perceived Costs Versus Benefits of Meeting the Kyoto Target for 
Greenhouse Gas Emission Reduction: The Australian Perspective, 16 ENVTL. & PLANNING L. J.
53, 54 (1999).
111. PEARSE, supra note 94.
37288-ckt_91-1 Sheet No. 89 Side A      12/28/2015   14:43:02
37288-ckt_91-1 Sheet No. 89 Side A      12/28/2015   14:43:02
6 OSOFSKY PEEL FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 12/10/2015 11:09 AM
2016] CLIMATE CHANGE IN PERSPECTIVE 163
On the domestic front, the Howard government enacted some 
climate change legislation,112 but it remained strongly opposed 
throughout its ten-year term to mandatory emissions reduction 
measures.113 This inaction on climate change became a focus of 
public opposition and activism. Several cases were brought before 
the federal courts seeking to bring greater public and political 
attention to the issue.114 However, unlike in the United States, where 
the Massachusetts v. EPA decision sparked major federal action, 
Australia’s more limited federal environmental laws restricted the 
scope for those opposed to the government’s policies to force 
executive action on climate change through judicial review.115
2. Legislative Flip – The Road to an Australian Carbon Price
The federal election in Australia in 2007 coincided with a high 
point in Australian public concern over climate change.116 Many 
were influenced in their views by Al Gore’s film, An Inconvenient 
Truth, as well as the strengthening of scientific findings of climate 
impact laid out in the fourth assessment report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.117 Australia was also 
in the midst of a devastating drought, which became known as the 
Millennium Drought.118 These factors combined to make climate 
change a salient issue in the 2007 election. Kevin Rudd and the 
Labor party, promising a new approach on climate change, were 
swept to power with a sizeable majority in the House of 
Representatives. The first act of the new government was to ratify 
the Kyoto Protocol, an announcement that saw Prime Minister Rudd 
112. Renewable Energy (Electricity) Act 2000 (Cth) (Austl.); Energy Efficiency 
Opportunities Act 2006 (Cth) (Austl.); National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting Act 2007 
(Cth) (Austl.).
113. Sensing changing public climate attitudes, in 2007 the Howard government 
commissioned a taskforce which recommended the adoption of an emissions trading scheme.
See AUSTL. GOV’T PRIME MINISTERIAL TASK GROUP ON EMISSIONS TRADING, REPORT OF THE 
TASK GROUP ON EMISSIONS TRADING 7 (2007). Howard went to the 2007 election with a 
promise that a national emissions trading scheme would be introduced no later than 2012, but 
lost the election.
114. Most notably, Wildlife Preservation Society of Queensland Proserpine/Whitsunday 
Branch Inc. v. Minister for the Environment and Heritage (2006) 232 ALR 510 (Austl.).
115. CLIMATE CHANGE LITIGATION, supra note 5, at 105–06.
116. See supra Section III.B.
117. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: SYNTHESIS 
REPORT 30–31 (Abdelkader Allali et al. eds., 2007).
118. On the role of climate change in the Millennium Drought, see Wenju Cai et al., Did 
Climate Change–Induced Rainfall Trends Contribute to the Australian Millennium Drought?,
27 J. CLIMATE 3145 (2014).
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receive a standing ovation at the UNFCCC Bali Conference of the 
Parties in December 2007.119
The Rudd government’s majority in the lower house and 
“mandate” to take federal action on climate change did not translate 
into climate change legislation as rapidly as many supporters hoped. 
Following an extensive advisory and consultation process, the 
government twice presented legislation in 2009 for a Carbon 
Pollution Reduction Scheme (CPRS)—a system of emissions 
trading applicable to large corporate emitters—but encountered 
opposition in the Senate from Coalition senators and the Australian 
Greens.120 Following the Senate’s second rejection of the CPRS 
legislation in October 2009, it seemed that the government was on 
the brink of a bipartisan deal on amendments to the law brokered 
with then leader of the Opposition, Malcolm Turnbull. However, 
partisan divides in the Coalition over climate change saw Turnbull’s 
leadership toppled in favor of Tony Abbott. With the conservative 
anti-climate faction in control, the Coalition party voted down the 
CPRS legislation for a third time in the Senate.121
This action by the opposition party in the Senate would have 
provided grounds for the Rudd government to activate the 
Constitution’s provisions to resolve the legislative deadlock. In the
meantime, however, the international climate summit at 
Copenhagen in December 2009—touted as the world’s last best 
chance to agree on a new framework to succeed the Kyoto 
Protocol—failed dismally to deliver anything close to a new treaty.122
Public support for climate change measures and the CPRS 
119. Bali Summit Applauds Rudd for Kyoto Move, ABC NEWS (Dec. 3, 2007), 
http://www.abc.net.au/news/2007-12-04/bali-summit-applauds-rudd-for-kyoto-move/976302.
120. Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme (Charges-General) Bill 2009 (Austl.); Carbon
Pollution Reduction Scheme Bill [No. 2] 2009 (Austl.). The Greens’ rejection of the CPRS was 
based on their view that the scheme did not have sufficiently stringent targets and made too 
many concessions to industry. See The Greens and Emissions Trading: Your Questions 
Answered, AUSTL. GREENS (Jan. 14, 2010),  http://greensmps.org.au/content/news-
stories/greens-and-emissions-trading-–-your-questions-answered#cantsupportCPRS.
121. Phillip Coorey, Shock Result as Abbott Wins Liberal Leadership by One Vote . . .
ETS Dead, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (Dec. 1, 2009), http://www.smh.com.au/national/shock-
result-as-abbott-wins-liberal-leadership-by-one-vote—ets-dead-20091130-k1uz.html. 
Ironically, Malcolm Turnbull has now defeated Tony Abbott to take over leadership of the 
Liberal Party and the Prime Ministership. Latika Bourke, Malcolm Turnbull Defeats Tony 
Abbott in Liberal Leadership Spill to Become Prime Minister, AGE (Sept. 14, 2015), 
http://www.theage.com.au/federal-politics/political-news/malcolm-turnbull-defeats-tony-abbott-
in-liberal-leadership-spill-to-become-prime-minister-20150914-gjmhiu.html.
122. Daniel Bodansky, The Copenhagen Climate Change Conference: A Post-Mortem,
104 AM. J. INT’L L. 230 (2010).
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collapsed, and the Rudd government decided to shelve the 
legislation for an emissions trading scheme. Having announced 
climate change as “the great moral challenge of our generation,” this 
policy failure on the part of the Rudd government dealt a major blow 
to the Prime Minister’s credibility. Facing dire public polling, the 
Labor Party took the extraordinary step to remove Rudd from the 
party leadership and to replace him with the deputy party leader, 
Julia Gillard.123
Soon after, Julia Gillard called a general election that she 
narrowly won over opposition leader Tony Abbott. Climate policy 
had again featured as an issue in the election campaign but given 
declining public support for strong climate measures, both major 
parties expressed opposition to introducing a “carbon tax.” In one 
now-infamous media interview, Julia Gillard promised that if elected 
there would be no carbon tax under her government. The election 
produced a hung parliament with neither major party having a 
majority of members in the House of Representatives. In order to 
form government, Julia Gillard reached a deal with the Australian 
Greens and independents that included agreeing to the Greens’ 
demands to revisit the issue of climate policy.
One year later, in November 2011, Prime Minister Julia Gillard’s 
government, with support from the Australian Greens in the Senate, 
successfully passed a legislative package to introduce a “carbon 
pricing mechanism.”124 The carbon pricing legislation, known as the 
Clean Energy Act 2011, took effect on July 1, 2012. The mechanism 
established a fixed period carbon price, commonly known as the 
carbon tax, that was set to transition to a fully-fledged emissions 
trading scheme from July 2015.125 However, this elaborate 
legislative regime has quickly “enter[ed] history as one of the best-
designed yet shortest-lived policies for climate change mitigation.”126
123. For an excellent insight into these dramatic events in Australian political history, see 
Sarah Ferguson, The Killing Season (3 episodes), ABC NEWS (June 2015), 
http://www.abc.net.au/news/programs/killing-season/.
124. Clean Energy Act 2011 (Cth) (Austl.); Clean Energy (Consequential Amendments) 
Act 2011 (Cth) (Austl.); Clean Energy Regulator Act 2011 (Cth) (Austl.); Climate Change 
Authority Act 2011 (Cth) (Austl.).
125. The design and early experience with the carbon pricing mechanism is described in 
Jacqueline Peel, The Australian Carbon Pricing Mechanism: Promise and Pitfalls on the 
Pathway to a Clean Energy Future, 15(1) MINN. J. L., SCI. & TECH. 429 (2014).
126. Frank Jotzo, Australia’s Carbon Price, 2 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 475, 476 (2012).
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3. Legislative Flop – Axing of the Carbon Tax
Far from a climate policy triumph, passage of the Clean Energy 
Act by the Gillard government quickly became a millstone around 
the neck of the Labor Party and the Prime Minister in particular. 
During 2011-2012, the Prime Minister and the government became 
deeply unpopular in the electorate, in part because of the “broken” 
pre-election promise not to introduce a carbon tax. Community 
opposition to the carbon tax was stirred by Tony Abbott (aided by 
the conservative media), who portrayed the carbon tax as “a giant 
new tax on everything.”127 Dismal polling for the Gillard government 
in the lead-up to the September 2013 federal election resulted in an 
internal party vote in June to reinstate Kevin Rudd as the new (old) 
leader of the party. This change did not save the Rudd/Gillard 
government, which was soundly defeated at the election that 
installed Tony Abbott as Prime Minister.128
The Abbott government’s “first order of business” following the 
election was the repeal of the carbon pricing legislation and 
dismantling of the supporting institutional infrastructure.129 Though 
opposition in the Senate from independent senators and the Greens 
frustrated some of the Abbott government’s attempts to repeal 
climate-related legislation,130 it successfully delivered on its election 
promise to “axe the carbon tax.”131 In place of the carbon-pricing 
scheme, the Abbott government enacted legislation for an 
Emissions Reduction Fund.132 This voluntary program allows 
127. Lenore Taylor, Tony Abbott’s Next Policy Vow: Anything But a ‘Great Big New Tax’,
AUSTRALIAN (Dec. 2, 2009), http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/tony-abbotts-next-policy-
vow-anything-but-a-great-big-new-tax/story-e6frg6n6-1225805927737.
128. West, supra note 105.
129. For details see Repealing the Carbon Tax, AUSTL. GOV’T DEP’T OF THE ENV’T,
http://www.environment.gov.au/climate-change/repealing-carbon-tax (last visited Aug. 29, 
2015).
130. In particular, the Abbott government failed to repeal legislation establishing the 
Climate Change Authority (which advises the government on emissions reduction targets) and 
the Clean Energy Finance Corporation (which provides funding for clean energy projects and 
technology development). See The Climate Change Authority (Abolition) Bill 2013,
PARLIAMENT OF AUSTL.,
http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Bills_Legislation/Bills_search_results/Result?
bId=r5136 (last visited Aug. 29, 2015); Clean Energy Finance Corporation (Abolition) Bill 
2014, PARLIAMENT OF AUSTL.,
http://aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Bills_Legislation/Bills_Search_Results/Result?bID=
r5288 (last visited Aug. 29, 2015).
131. See Clean Energy Legislation (Carbon Tax Repeal) Act 2014 (Cth) (Austl.).
132. See Carbon Farming Initiative Amendment Act 2014 (Cth) (Austl.) (amending the 
Carbon Credits (Carbon Farming Initiative) Act 2011 (Cth) (Austl.)).
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businesses to bid for public monies to undertake activities that will 
reduce emissions, an approach that has been roundly criticized by 
economists and climate policy advocates as more costly and less 
environmentally effective than a carbon price.133
Evidence from Australia’s annual emissions data indicates that 
the carbon price had a measurable effect on emissions, especially 
from the power sector.134 However, with the repeal of the carbon 
pricing legislation, these reductions have been reversed as coal 
plants increase production and renewable energy producers retreat 
from the electricity market.135 Given the short life of the carbon price 
and the political uncertainty that attended it from its birth, Australian 
businesses generally did not make major clean energy infrastructure 
investments under the Gillard government that might have locked in 
the effects of the carbon pricing legislation.
With the ousting of Abbott from the Prime Ministership by 
Malcolm Turnbull, the course of climate change policy in Australia is 
again uncertain. Turnbull infamously supported Rudd’s CPRS 
legislation for an emissions trading scheme, a move that led to his 
downfall as opposition leader and replacement with the more hard-
line Abbott.136 At the time of his overthrow by Abbott, Turnbull 
announced: “I will not lead a party that is not as committed to 
effective action on climate change as I am.”137 However, even with 
public attitudes shifting in favor of stronger climate measures, Prime 
Minister Turnbull’s actions may be constrained by his partisan, 
conservative colleagues. Already, Turnbull has indicated that he will 
not make changes to the Australian emissions reduction target 
announced in the lead-up to the December 2015 international 
133. Paul Burke & Frank Jotzo, Direct Action Subsidies: Wrong Way, Go Back, INSIDE 
STORY (Mar. 17, 2014), http://insiderstory.org.au/direct-action-subsidies-wrong-way-go-back; 
Peter Christoff, On These Numbers, Australia’s Emissions Auction Won’t Get the Job Done,
CONVERSATION (Apr. 26, 2015), http://theconversation.com/on-these-numbers-australias-
emissions-auction-wont-get-the-job-done-40761; Peter Hannam & Johnathan Swan, Ross 
Garnaut Slams Abbott Government’s Direct Action Policy as Like a ‘Martian Beauty Contest’,
SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (Mar. 7, 2014), http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-
news/ross-garnaut-slams-abbott-governments-direct-action-policy-as-like-a-martian-beauty-
contest-20140306-34atj.html.
134. Marianna O’Gorman & Frank Jotzo, Impact of the Carbon Price on Australia’s 
Electricity Demand, Supply and Emissions, ECON PAPERS (July 14, 2014), 
http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:een:ccepwp:1411.
135. Carbon Tax Repeal Sparks Jump in Australia’s Electricity Emissions, GUARDIAN (July 
5, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/jul/05/carbon-tax-repeal-sparks-
jump-in-australias-electricity-emissions.
136. See Coorey, supra note 121.
137. See Taylor, supra note 93.
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climate negotiations in Paris.138 The only thing that seems certain is 
that climate change will remain an issue of high political salience in 
Australia, with every chance that next federal election—due in 
November 2016—will see another legislative flip on climate change.
IV. CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS: PROGRESS IN PARTISAN 
ENVIRONMENTS?
In the final analysis, the Australian example suggests that a less 
gridlocked legislative system does not necessarily produce better 
results. Neither system is ideal for making progress in a partisan 
environment. While one can debate the merits of legislative inaction 
versus inconsistency, both the U.S. congressional gridlock paired 
with executive assertions of authority and Australian flip-flopping 
legislation are problematic. Partisanship in both systems makes 
progress on climate change, and the other politically contentious 
issues explored in this symposium, vulnerable. In the United States, 
gains on climate policy under one administration could be 
significantly undermined if the other party wins the presidential 
election.139 In Australia, similar shifts in policy happen, just through 
the legislature rather than the executive branch.140
We argue in Energy Partisanship that these types of partisan 
divisions generally lead to two strategies to achieve progress: “going 
around” strategies in which one side circumvents the other and 
“going together” strategies in which people find common ground.141
Thus far, this essay has focused primarily on “going around” 
strategies in which one side gains control of mechanisms of power, 
whether in the legislative or executive branch, and uses it to 
advance policy. These kinds of strategies can accomplish a great 
deal quickly, and if they are around long enough, they can result in 
corporate lock-in and path dependency that may survive a change in 
political winds. The Obama administration’s executive branch action 
138. Michelle Innis, Malcolm Turnbull Defeats Tony Abbott to Become Party Leader and 
Prime Minister of Australia, N. Y. TIMES (Sept. 14, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/15/world/asia/tony-abbott-liberal-party-australia.html?_r=0.
On Australia’s post-2020 targets, which are amongst the lowest announced by any developed
country, see Pep Canadell et al., Australia’s Post-2020 Climate Target Not Enough to Stop 2C 
Warming: Experts, CONVERSATION (Aug. 11, 2015), https://theconversation.com/australias-
post-2020-climate-target-not-enough-to-stop-2c-warming-experts-45879.
139. See infra Part II.
140. See infra Part III.
141. Peel & Osofsky, supra note 16.
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has put mitigation and adaptation measures into place that a 
gridlocked Congress has not managed to overturn.142 The Australian 
government’s carbon pricing legislation represented a major step 
forward in its efforts to address climate change.143 But the 
vulnerability of these measures to the election cycle, which can have 
a chilling effect on investment and corporate lock-in,144 suggests that 
“going together” strategies must also be a crucial part of the puzzle.
Our research on partisanship indicates that both substantive 
and structural reframing of the climate change issue can play a role. 
Substantive reframing, especially when focused on economic 
development or disaster resilience, has produced bipartisan 
cooperation and also serves mitigation and adaptation goals, 
whether climate change is mentioned or not. Structural reframing, in 
which the action is shifted to forums that are less contentious, often 
pairs well with this substantive reframing. We have found that 
scaling down to state and local levels, and focusing more directly on 
the private sector and financial incentives for corporate action can 
provide opportunities for cooperation. Such bipartisan collaboration 
has often been elusive in the contentious environments of both
countries’ federal governments despite its potential contributions to 
policy progress. The substantive and structural reframing strategies 
thus may have an important role to play in these countries’ partisan 
environments.145
None of these strategies is a panacea, though, and our analysis 
of the political vulnerability of the Obama administration’s executive 
action is not intended as a critique of the President’s choosing to act 
in the context. Partisanship, and the constant media focus on 
conflict, makes meaningful progress difficult and “going around” 
strategies necessary at times. The Obama administration would not 
have achieved the gains it has on climate change without its—often 
very controversial—executive action. As mothers who are not 
skeptical of climate change science, we think making progress on 
this problem is urgent.
142. See infra Section II.C.
143. See infra Section III.B.
144. See, e.g., Giles Parkinson, Australia’s Renewable Energy Renaissance May Be Over 
in 5 Years, RENEW ECON. (July 16, 2015), http://reneweconomy.com.au/2015/australias-
renewable-energy-renaissance-may-be-over-in-5-years-87926 (arguing that without longer-
term policy signals, the renewable energy industry will fall off a cliff).
145. We have explored these framings in depth, relying on extensive interviews and case 
studies in Peel & Osofsky, supra note 16.
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Rather, the primary purpose of this essay is to make clear that 
congressional dysfunction is not the heart of the problem. 
Partisanship plays just as poisonous a role in other systems of 
government, as demonstrated by this essay’s comparative analysis. 
In any democratic system in which people and their representatives 
are deeply politically divided, one side will likely resort to going 
around the other to achieve progress. But this phenomenon across 
systems underscores the importance of finding ways to tamp down 
the conflict and focus on common ground. Our work on partisanship 
suggests that this is possible to a greater extent than the tenor of 
political dialogue in both countries suggests, and at least as crucial 
to making progress as bold executive and legislative action by one 
party or coalition.146
146. Id.
